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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE BOWLING CLUB, a non-profit
corporation of the State of Utah,
Petitioner and .Appellant,
-vs.LAMONT F. TORONTO, Secretary
of State of the State of Utah,
Respondent.

Case
No.10253

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant, a non-profit corporation organized
under the laws of the State of Utah, appeals from a
decision of the Secretary of State revoking the charter
of the corporation for violations of the Utah Liquor
Control Act. rrhe action of the Secretary of State was
eoute~ted in the District Court, Third Judicial District, by
writ of f'ertiorari and upheld.

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respo11de11t agrees to the statement of appellant
as to the disposition of the instant case in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the Secretary of State and its affirmance by the Third Judicial
District Court, revoking the appellant's charter, should
be upheld by this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of
facts:
The Secretary of State, pursuant to notice, issued
an order to show cause why the charter of the Bowling
Club, a non-profit private corporation, should not be revoked and the $5,000 bond forfeited to the State of Utah
for violation of the Utah State Liquor Control Act (R. 2).
At the time of the hearing the only appearance made by
the Bowling Club was a motion to quash for failure of
proper notice (R. 2). No other objection to the proceedings was raised nor did the Bowling Club examine
any of the witnessrs who were present or otherwise offer
evidence on the issue.
An audiogn1phic record of the proceedings before
the Secretary of State is attached to the instant record.
2

Generally, the evidence discloses that Mr. William N.
Brady, an investigator of the Federal Alcohol and Tax
Division, on the 7th day of April, 1964, entered the
Bowling Club and purchased several alcoholic drinks containing Bourbon and Scotch whisky on a retail basis.
Further, he was given a pink guest card which would
admit him to the Bowling Club on other occasions. On
April 8, Mr. Brady returned to the Bowling Club and
purchased another Bourbon and 7-Up for 50c. Thereafter, he purchased five additional drinks from the bartender. On May 25, Mr. Brady returned and purchased
five additional drinks containing intoxicating liquor at
the bar on the club premises. Later on that day he returned to the club with officer Allen B. Clark of the Salt
Lake City Vice Control Division and the wife of Sgt.
Johnson of the Salt Lake City Vice Squad. They purchased several drinks of intoxicating liquor, including
Rcotch and Vodka. The same thing occurred on the 17th
of June, 1964, at which time Mr. Brady purchased a
half-pint of whisky from the bartender at the Bowling
Club.
Subsequently, on the 18th day of June, 1964, a search
warrant was obtained from the Honorable A. H. Ellett,
District Judge, and at 4 :30 p.m., a search of the premises of the Bowling Club was made and 75 bottles more
or less of alcoholic beverages were seized. Subsequently,
a hearing in the case entitled, "Utah Liquor Control
Commission v. 75 Bottles More or Less Seized From the
Premises of That Certain Establishment Known as the
Howling Club," was had. The :findings of fact and con-
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clusions of law of that hearing are appended to the record on appeal. rrlrn court expressly found that alcoholic
beverages ·were being served on a retail drink-by-drink
basis at the Bowling Club, and that alcoholic beverages
were being stored on the premises for the purpose of
illegal sale in violation of Title 32, U.C.A. 1953. The
court ordered the seized alcoholic beverages forfeited.
The evidence concerning the purchase of alcoholic drinks
on a retail basis and the search of the premises of the
Bowling Club was all received by the Secretary of State
without objection from anyone representing the Bowling
Club. All of the witnesses who appeared and testified
did so without being administered any formal oath. All
the witnesses, however, indicated that they recognized a
duty to tell the truth and intended to tell the truth. No
objection was made to the failure of any witnesses to be
sworn. Based upon the evidence, the Secretary of State
determined that the Bowling Club had violated the provisions of the Utah Liquor Control Act, and ordered the
club charter forfeited. The appellant sought certiorari
from the District Court which was ultimately denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
rrHE FAIL URE OF WITNESSES TESTIFYING AT 'l1 HE HEARING BEFORE THE SECRJ1JTARY OF srrATE TO BE SWORN DOES
NOT VITIATE THE PROCEEDINGS.
At the time of the hearing before the Secretary of
State, each of the witnesses that were called were ad4

vised that they should tell the truth and indicated that
they intended to do so. None of the witnesses were given
formal oaths. No one on behalf of the appellant objected
to the procedure nor objected to the testimony.
16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
'' • • • The secretary of state shall hold a
hearing, after notice, for purposes of determining
whether a club or association incorporating or
opera ting under this chapter is organized or opera ting in accordance with the law. Notice shall
be sufficient if sent by registered mail to the principal place of business or to any of the officers of
such club or association. If it is shown after a
hearing that any such club or association (1) was
actually organized for pecuniary profit, (2) was
used for gambling or other purposes in violation
of any law or ordinance inluding, but not limited
to, violations of the Liquor Control Act, as amended, ( 3) has failed to maintain or make available
to the secretary of state a record of its membership, or ( 4) has failed to procure and file with the
secretary of state, within the time herein prescribed, and maintained in good standing a bond
ns herein provided or has failed to file and/or keep
on record with the secretary of state a copy of its
constitution, bylaws and house rules which must
be in conformity with the requirements of this
chapter, or has failed to conform to or abide by
such constitution and bylaws and house rules, the
secretary of state shall revoke the charter of such
corporation.''
It is obvious that the Secretary of State acts in an
administrative capacity and that the hearing is not a
formal trial. Even if it were, it is well settled that the
failure of a party to object to the failure of a witness to
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be administered an oath precludes any claim of error or
prejudice. Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., ~ 1819, notes:
''This modern practice does not abate the ordinary rule that the failure to make an objection to
competency at the proper time is a waiver (ante,
~~ 18, 486). Hence, if a ~witness who has not taken
the oath is by inadvertence put on the stand, the
opponent's subsequent discovery and objection
should not avail! * * * ''
(Emphasis added)
In Richards v. Hugh, 51 L.J.Q.B. 361 (Canada 1882),
it was ruled that the failure of a party to object because
a witness was not sworn was a waiver of any irregularity.
In People v. McAdoo, 184 N.Y. 304, 77 N.E. 260 (1906),
a hearing was held before a police commissioner. A witness was not sworn. The New York Court of Appeals
ruled that where the party was aware of the failure to
swear the witness and failed to object, no claim of error
could be sustained. See also Sears v. United States, 264
Fed. 257 (1st Cir. 1920); In re DaRoza's Estate, 82 Cal.
App. 2d 550, 186 P. 2d 725 (1947). In the instant case
counsel for the appellant were present during the whole
hearing, made no objection to the proceedings, and declined to take part in the hearing, apparently relying on
the motion to quash. It is apparent, therefore, that no
claim of error can be predicated on the failure of the
witneRses to be sworn because no objection was made.
Secondly, it should be noted that 16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953,
in no way requires that witnesses that may appear should
be sworn. It does not purport to make such a requirement mandatory or even permissively empower the Secretary of State to swear witnesses. Administrative pro-
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ceedings are generally not required to maintain the same
formality as court trials. Davis, Administrative DOIW,
~ 14.01. 'l1he appellant contends 78-24-16, U.C.A. 1953
is applicable. That section provides:
''Every court, every judge, clerk and deputy
clerk of any court, every justice, every notary public, and every officer or person authorized to take
testimony in any action or proceeding, or to decide
upon evidence, has power to administer oaths or
affirmations." (Emphasis added)
It should be noted that that section is perm1ss1ve,
not mandatory. The section does not require that oaths
be administered in administrative hearings. The general
rule is that in the absence of a mandatory statute a failure
to swear witnesses does not invalidate the proceedings.
Thus, in 73, C.J.S., Public Administrative Bodies, § 127,
it is noted:

"It has been held that, where the administrative body is authorized to administer oaths, all
witnesses must be sworn, but the swearing of witnesses may be waived, and, where the statute does
not require that the sworn testimony of witnesses
be taken, a failure to swear the witnesses does not
invalidate the proceeding.''
See Wilson v. Township Committee, 123 N.J.L. 474,
9 A. 2d 771; Amen v. City of Rahway, 117 N.J.L. 589,
190 Atl. 506.. In Duffard v. City of Corpus Christi, 332
f;.\V. 2d 447 ('l1ex. 1960), an action was brought attacking
stred paving assessments. Texas law required a public
hearing before the City Council. Oaths were not given

7

the witnesses.
proceedings :

The court stated on appeal attacking the

"Appellants attack the proceedings before the
City Council on account of alleged irregularities
therein, because the witnesses were not sworn, because the Council permitted leading questions,
because witnesses gave testimony based upon conclusions and hearsay, aud because the expert witnesses who testified as to the enhancement of the
value of property abutting on the improved street
were not in fact experts. These contentions must
be overruled. The rules as to the examination of
witnesses are relaxed in administrative proceedings, and where the statute does not require that
sworn testimony be taken, a failure to swear the
witnesses does not invalidate the proceedings.
73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure§ 127, p. 450; State ex rel. Townsend v. City
of Mission, rrex. Civ. App., 329 S.W. 2d 98."
See also 3 Am. Jur., Arbitration and Award,§ 109;
Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581.
Consequently, since nothing makes the requirement
of an oath mandatory, and since appellant did not object
or participate in the proceedings before the Secretary,
there is no merit to the contention that the failure to administer an oath to the witnesses vitiated the proceedings. Especially is this true where a certified copy of a
court judgment and findings was received which action
showed the appellant had been judicially determined to
have violated the Liquor Control Act.
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POINT II.
'l1HE PROVISIONS OF 16-6-13, U.C.A. 1953, ET
SEQ., RELATING TO THE POWER OF THE
SECRETARY OJ.i-, STATE TO FORFEIT THE
CHARTER OF A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION \VAS NOT REPEALED BY THE ENA CTM:ENT OJi-, 32-8-7, U.C.A. 1953, ALLOWING
A COURT TO REVOKE A CORPORATE
CHARTER ON CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING THE LIQUOR CONTROL ACT.
rrlie appellant contends that the provisions of 16-6-13
and 13.l, U.C.A. 1953, which allow the Secretary of State
to forfeit the charter of non-profit liquor locker clubs
and forfeit the bond required to be posted under 16-6-13.1,
U.C.A. 1953, were impliedly repealed when the Legislatnre enacted 32-8-7, U.C.A. 1953. Chapter 8 of Title 32
is part of the Liquor Control Act and provides penalties for the violation of the Act. In 1959 the Legislature
amended Section 32-8-7, U.C.A. 1953, and it now reads:

''Every person who violates any of the provisions of section 32-7-1and32-7-7 shall be imprisoned for not less than three months nor more than
six months or fined in an .amount not to exceed
$1000 or both. Every corporation which violates
any of the provisions of section 32-7-1 and 32-7-7
shall be fined in an amount not to exceed $2500
or have its charter revoked by a court of record
or both.''
It should be noted that this provision covers both
fH'ofit corporations and non-profit corporations, but provides for criminal penalties. Nowhere does the section
say the bonding provisions of 16-6-13.1 are repealed or
9

that the Secretary of State's authority under 16-6-13
and 13.1, which was provided for in 1955 (Laws of Utah
1955, Ch. 25 § 1) is repealed. 'l1here is nothing inconsistent about giving the Secretary of State administrative
authority to revoke a charter and giving a court authority
to revoke a charter on criminal conviction. The Secretary might have access to more information than a court.
Further, the court's power to revoke is based upon a
conviction, whereas the Secretary may revoke without a
conviction and does not have to depend on whether or
not a sheriff or county attorney may press the matter.
However, a more obvious reason for not finding an implied repeal exists. In 1963 the Legislature amended
the Non-Profit Corporation Act by enacting the Model
Non-Profit Corporation Act. The sections (16-6-1-12,
U.C.A. 1953) immediately preceding 16-6-13 were expressly repealed, whereas nothing was done about repealing 16-6-13, et seq. Certainly, if the Legislature had
intended these provisions to be no longer applicable, they
would, at that time, have cleared the books of any reference to them. In fact, the Legislature did just the opposite and expressly said that 16-6-13, et seq., were not
repealed. rrlrns, 16-6-111, U .C.A. 1953, enacted in 1963,
provides:
''Sections 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-13.3,
16-6-14 and 16-6-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
pertaining to certain types of nonprofit corporations, shall in no way he deemed repealed in whole
or in part by the provisions of this act and all
n~ferenccs in said sections to corporations "incorporating," "incorporated" or "to be incorporated" under or pursuant to "this chapter" shall be
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deemed to include such types of non-profit corporations organized under this act or otherwise
governed by the provisions of this act.''
Certainly, therefore, the Legislature could not have
intended that 16-6-13, et seq., would be repealed by 32-8-7,
U.C.A. 195:3, and obviously felt the former sections were
still in effect.
'I1he Legislature is presumed to intend to achieve a
eo11sistent body of law. Sutherland, Statutory Construction,§ 2012, and subsequent legislation is not presumed to
repeal prior legislation without an express intent. Sutherland, op. cit., §§ 2012 and 2014.
This court has consistently refused to find an implied repeal of an existing statute unless the later enacted
statute is absolutely irreconcilable with the former. Glenn
''·Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P. 2d 380; State Tax Comm.
v. Board of Commissioners, 1 Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961;
Thompson v. Harris, 106 Utah 32, 144 P. 2d 761. In McCoy
v Severson, 118 Utah 502, 222 P. 2d 1058 (1950), this court
observed:
"It is a rule of statutory construction that
where there are two or more statutes dealing with
the same subject matter they will be construed so
as to maintain the integrity of both. Repeal by
implication is not effected unless the terms of the
later enacted law are irreconcilable with the
former.
In Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 103
Utah 186, 134 P. 2d 469 (1943), this court noted:
'' * * * Whether there has been a repeal by impliea tion is primarily a question of legislative in-
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tent, and it cannot be adjudgeu that there has been
such a repeal unless the legislative intent clearly
appears. People v. McAllister, 10 Utah 357, 37
P. 578; State v. Carmen, 44 Utah 353, 140 P. 670;
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P.
96, 77 Am. St. Rep. 928; 59 C. J. 904 et seq.''
No intention to repeal 16-6-13, et seq., is found
merely because a court on conviction is also authorized
to revoke a charter. The Legislature obviously intended
both authorities to exercise the power. One power is
exercised in a criminal case, the other in a civil proceeding. This is not inconsistency but consistency among the
sovereign bodies.
It is submitted, therefore, that the contention that
the provisions of 16-6-13, et seq., have been impliedly
repealed is without merit.

POINT III.
THE OPERATION OF THE UTAH LIQUOR
CONTROL ACT IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 16-6-13
AND 16-6-13.1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, DOES NOT RESULT IN A VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 9, OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
The appellant contends that since Section 32-8-7,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides for a fine of $1,000
against any individual violating the illegal sale provisions of the Liquor Control Act and since the same provision subject a corporation to a fine of $2,500, these pen12

alties, when coupled with the provisions of 16-6-13 and
16-6-13.1 providing for forfeiture of a $5,000 bond on violation of the Liquor Control Act, result in the imposition
of an Rxcessive fine in violation of Article I, Section 9, of
the Utah Constitution.

In the instant case it should be noted that there is no
evidence of any criminal conviction or punishment as
having yet been imposed. The appellant in its brief states
tlrn t there was a case filed against the corporation which
is still pending and for which a preliminary hearing has
been scheduled for March 6, 1965. Consequently, there
is no basis to contend an excessive fine is in any way
inrnlved in the instant case, since no fine has in fact been
imposed. Secondly, it should be noted that the corporation is a distinct and separate entity from the individuals
who might be otherwise charged with violating the Liquor
Control Act. Therefore, in determining whether any fine
is excessive, it would not be proper to add the individual fines to the corporate fines. There is no showing
that any individual has been charged with violating the
Liquor Control Act or is otherwise subject to a fine for
conduct arising out of the same incidents as formed the
basis for the revocation of the corporate charter.
It should be noted that in State v. Franklin, 63 Utah
442, 226 Pac. 674 (1924), this court indicated that the penalty provisions in the nuisance section for violating the
Liquor Control Act were not necessarily the same thing
as a fine but rather were a statutory penalty in the nature
of a tax. Consequentlly, it would appear that the pro\1s1011 of lG-6-13 and 13.1, relating to the forfeiture of
13

a corporate bond, are not fines to be eonsidered iu determining whether or not an excessive fine has been imposed.
Supporting this proposition is the decision of this court
in Disabled American Veterans v. Toronto, 12 U. 2d 213,
364 P. 2d 830 (1961). In that case the petitioner contended that since the corporation was fined $1,000 upon its
plea of guilty for violation of the liquor law, the Secretary of State should not have ordered the forfeiture of its
bond. The court stated:

'' * * * We find no merit to such argument. The
bond was given for the express purpose of ensuring compliance with the laws of the State of Utah
and was subject to forfeiture upon a revocation
of the charter of a corporation for a violation of
such laws. The action of a court in fining appellant upon a finding of guilt for a liquor law violation can in no way affect appellant's liability
under its bond given to the Secretary of State as
a condition to being allowed to maintain premises
upon which liquor could be stored or consumed.''
It seems obvious that in the absence of a showing
that, in fact, any fine has been imposed, the appellant is
in no position to complain of a constitutional violation.
Even so, it is obvious that a $2,500 fine coupled with a
bond forfeiture is not excessive. In 24B C.J.S., Criminal
Law, 1978, it is stated:
"'I1he eourts are reluctant to say that the legislature has exceeded its power in authorizing
excessivP fines, a11d as a general rule will not do
so except in a very clear case, and, therefore, the
widest latitude should be given to the discretion
aud judgment of the legislature in determining the
14

amount necessary to accomplish the object and
purpose it has in view.
''In determining whether a fine authorized by
statute is excessive in the constitutional sense, due
regard must be had to the object designed to be
accomplished, to the importance and magnitude
of the public interest sought to be protected, to
the circumstances and the nature of the act for
which it is imposed, and in some instances to the
ability of accused to pay, although the mere fact
that in a particular case accused is unable to pay
the fine required to be assessed does not render
the statute unconstitutional.
''In order to justify the court in interfering
and setting aside a judgment for a fine authorized
by statute, the fine imposed must be so excessive
and unusual, and so disproportionate to the offense committed, as to shock public sentiment and
violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.''

l

See specifically Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 68 S.W. 34
and Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 840, 56 S.E. 149,
where both courts determined that the imposition of fines
for each sale in violation of the state liquor control act
was not unconstitutional as being an excessive fine. With
the instant legislation the Legislature is endeavoring to
control the sale, distribution and use of liquor and in
an effort to do so, it has imposed strong measures. However, these penalties, when weighed in light of the Constitution and the penalties fixed for other crimes made
punishable hy both the state and federal governments,
make it manifest that it is not excessive. In State v.
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Franklin, supra, this court quoted with approval the decision of State v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W. 953, in
which the court there observed that the forfeiture and
sale of personal property used in maintenance of a liquor
nuisance was not in violation of the constitution as being
an excessive fine or unusual punishment. It is apparent,
therefore, that there is no merit for the contention that
the constitutional provision against excessive fines is violated in the instant case.
As to the contentions and assertions of appellant
that other clubs are violating the State Liquor Control
Act, it may be noted that a particular number of prosecutions have been undertaken. Further, there is no
showing that in any particular case the Secretary of State
is discriminating in his application of the law. It may be
that the present State Liquor Act is unworkable from an
enforcement standpoint, but this is a matter for the Legislature and not a matter for this court to declare by judicial fiat that it is henceforth permissible to violate the
law.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised on appeal in the instant case afford
the appellant no basis for the contention that the forfeiture of its charter was not proper. The record was well
documented to support the conclusion that the State
Liquor Control Act was violated by the appellant in an
open, notorious and flagrant manner. Appellant did not
participate in the proceedings before the Secretary of
State and, therefore, is foreclosed of complaining of any
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irregularity that may have occurred. Even so, it is obvious that the complaint registered by the appellant affords no basis for relief. The contentions of the appellant, when analyzed against the facts and law, make it
manifest that this court should affirm the judgment of the
trial court and the Secretary of State.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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